



THE New Republic

Interview with
The New Iraqi
UN Delegate

Page 8

The Independence Of the Middle East

Independent of What?

Guaranteed by Whom?

Threatened How?

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

DENIS HEALEY

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

DON PERETZ

HASHIM JAWAD

BUSHROD HOWARD, JR.

AUGUST 4, 1958

25 cents



Washington Wire

Hooked Fish

THE ADMINISTRATION will probably come up with a positive policy for the Middle East if a Summit Conference is really held. Heart of it will be recognition of Arab nationalism, offers of peaceful cooperation and greater economic aid. It is the policy the Administration should have formulated years ago. Instead, we blew hot and cold on the Aswan Dam, on the Baghdad pact, on France and Britain. Lacking a fixed policy, events led us, not we events.

A UN Summit Conference should not necessarily be a propaganda victory for Moscow. It will be, of course, if Eisenhower maintains his present unhappy attitude of being dragged into the boat kicking like a hooked fish. We have the stronger arguments, the more altruistic motives — we lack the trumpet voice. Uncion won't do. Maybe Macmillan or de Gaulle can speak for America if the US can't produce its own champions.

Two things we should have thought Eisenhower might have done in the crisis: guided public opinion by frequent fireside talks, and brought in Harry Truman in a show of national unity. The White House has treated Truman with petty vindictiveness. Truman last week made an appeal for national support of the Administration in the crisis. Yet Eisenhower has not now, nor in five previous years, called in Truman. Truman, you remember, gladly consulted and honored Herbert Hoover.

It is imperative at a moment like this to keep the public informed. The President gave initial TV appearances; after that the White House drawbridge went up; no press conferences since July 2; no further explanations on TV of the seeming paradox of why we first wanted in in Lebanon, then suddenly wanted out. Does the public understand? Not according to letters reaching Congress! A striking phenomenon is the almost complete absence of such communications. Stacks

of mail are pouring in but perplexed Congressmen say it is mostly on the humane slaughter bill and on keeping alcohol off airplanes.

There is no tradition in Congress, as there is in Parliament, of automatically holding a debate on the pros and cons of any great event. On the contrary Speaker Sam Rayburn feels the patriotic thing now is to keep silent on the whole subject. He has imposed a virtual blackout. One can support the Administration's step but at the same time wish that it could be fully debated. Public opinion turned vainly for enlightenment last week, first to the White House, then to Congress.

Lebanon and Little Rock

DOES THE Middle East aid the Republicans? Yes, to the extent it takes Sherman Adams off the front page and substitutes an image of positive for negative White House leadership. In the long run our guess is "No," because we suspect (and fear) that the same ineptness that allowed the Soviets to score "a smashing propaganda victory" (in the words of AP columnist James Marlow) will be inadequate to the sequel. The lasting image will be of an Administration that waits too long and then uses troops, whether in Lebanon or Little Rock.

The big reason that protecting Khrushchev in America is such a problem is that this country alone among modern nations permits firearms to be sold at the first hardware store. It is why our Presidents must be guarded so closely by Secret Service. Canadians couldn't understand the extraordinary precautions taken for Eisenhower in Ottawa: it is a source of wonder and derision whenever a President travels abroad. Three presidents have been killed (all shot), others have been under fire; our fantastic murder rate is built on firearms, American civilization is founded on the cheap revolver. Any effort for a Federal license brings screams from small arms manufacturers that the Constitution guarantees the "right to bear arms" (a reference, of

course, to local militia). America is the only big country left that puts a gun in the hands of any drunk. Our cozy little custom takes on new meaning with a visit from Nikita.

Civil service regulations provide penalties up to dismissal and three years disbarment from Federal service for government workers making intentional misstatements in job applications. Eisenhower, through Sherman Adams, recommended for Civil Service Commissioner one Bernard Flanagan who is now shown to have made 24 separate misstatements in his own application, including claims for college credits and a degree he never took. Flanagan was picked to pass on the ability, fitness and integrity of 2.3 million other government workers. After serving seven months with interim pay Eisenhower has now withdrawn his name.

If Flanagan isn't going to watch Federal employees, however, Rep. Walter's House Un-American Activities Committee is. The Supreme Court in the 1956 Cole case ruled that the security program applies only to sensitive jobs. Now Congress has passed and taken to conference the Walter bill reversing the Supreme Court and reviving for all government jobs, sensitive or not, the old system of secret charges, anonymous informers and the burden of proof on the accused.

The big thing to note about the recession is that it's fading without any reduction in prices or cost of living. The one good thing about most recessions is that they take care of inflation, at least temporarily, by bringing prices back to earth. Not this one. Actually what looks like a new inflationary binge in the stock market, sparked by the Lebanon crisis, is underway. Big government deficits hint at more inflation.

Notes

OUR INFORMATION still is that Sherman Adams will quit. . . . We understand that US Steel is waiting for Congress to adjourn before raising prices. . . . With the launching of our new satellite the score stands: US four, total weight 103.05 lbs.; USSR three, total weight 4227.53 lbs. . . . Eisenhower last April invited 14 nations to witness an August demonstration of the "clean" A-bomb, a subject of world controversy; now the whole show has been abruptly cancelled, arousing new Soviet jeers.

T.R.B.

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION



1244 19TH ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

VOL. 139, No. 5-6, ISSUE 2281-82
AUGUST 4, 1958

THE WEEK 3

*Picking Ourselves Up: Balance Sheet;
The Role of the UN; Neutralism and
"Neutralization"; The Survival of
Israel*

ARTICLES 8

*Conversation with Hashim Jawad of
Iraq*

by Bushrod Howard, Jr.

Iraq's New Rulers

by Walter Laqueur

What Was Gained by Intervention?

by Denis Healey

If There Were No Nasser

by Don Peretz

The Lebanese Disaster

by Hans J. Morgenthau

Goodbye to a Dollar a Barrel

by Bushrod Howard, Jr.

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
MICHAEL STRAIGHT, *Editor-at-Large*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. RUSKIN, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M.
Bickel, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe,
Gerald W. Johnson, James E. King, Jr.,
Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller

Published weekly (except for omissions of four
summer issues) and distributed to newsstands by
the Eastern News Company, N. Y. 14, N. Y.
Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class
matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at
Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3,
1879. Single copy, 25¢; Yearly subscription,
\$8.00; Foreign, \$9.00. Armed Forces personnel
or students, \$5.00. Subscribers desiring change
of address should notify us at least three weeks
in advance. Please include both old and new
addresses. Copyright, 1958, by Harrison-Blaine,
Inc.

Correspondence

► A Creative Diplomacy

SIRS:

MANY years ago, in another era when
militant self-righteousness was pop-
ular, kings of Europe professed the ne-
cessity of mounting great and costly
crusades to defend chosen Middle East-
ern lands from annexation by the in-

(Continued on page 23)

Picking Ourselves Up

WE DO NOT know whether the President—hard-pressed by the Turks—was prepared on July 14 to intervene in Iraq. The Russians, we have learned, were sufficiently worried to dispatch an exceptionally large number of airborne forces to Bulgaria, under the cover of "maneuvers." The "maneuvers," significantly, were directed by the Commander of air transport of Soviet airborne forces—Marshal of Aviation Skripko. On July 15, the day after the Iraqi *coup*, elements of the US Tactical Air Command were in flight to Turkey. The Soviet Government, on July 24, repeated a warning against intervention in Iraq. But by this time, the danger had passed, because the *coup* was clearly irreversible. The decision had been made in Washington to accept, angrily, the inevitable. Instead, Marines were landed in Lebanon.

This was the third time the President had called out the troops. The first was when he sent the Army to Little Rock to put down mob resistance to the decision of a court. The second was his dispatch of Army and Marine units to the Caribbean when Vice President Nixon was the victim of mob violence in Venezuela. In neither instance—nor in Lebanon—was military force deployed to "fight"; in each case its purpose was, in the President's mind, to uphold order.

It is not to his discredit to suggest that these three actions can be explained by reference to Mr. Eisenhower's military training. In crises, he prefers "peaceful" solutions that accord with the forms of law. But when the other side appears to him in the guise of peace-breaker, military conditioning asserts itself. The Anglo-Saxon tradition that soldiers are the servants of the state is more than a rule of discipline; it is also a source of security. It gives the English-speaking military professional an established place in an ordered world. It also relieves him of the burden of difficult—often complex political—decisions. It spares him too the odium of responsibility for decisions that will make domestic enemies.

But if the military authorities are to be disciplined, are to be mastered and shielded, there must of course be a civilian authority. And when that authority is challenged, the professional is moved by a deep sense of insecurity and of wrong. To guarantee government, to uphold law, the military will act with alacrity. There is here no Latin tolerance of political agitation, no feeling that violence has its place in historic change.

We can be grateful indeed for the centuries that have written this instinct into the minds of our military men. But as a principle to guide the conduct of the United States in world affairs—and more specifically, Middle East affairs—the instinct is a poor guide—unless, as the *Wall Street Journal* has suggested, "we intend to create our own little principalities in the Middle East and be prepared to police them endlessly."

We do not want to imply that the display or use of force—even force un-
blessed by the United Nations—is never justified. Our criticism of the way
the President and Mr. Dulles handle our foreign affairs—in Lebanon and

long before that—is essentially a political criticism. It is directed to the near-sightedness of our leadership, to its limited understanding of what is happening in the world. And, in the case of the Secretary, there is that persistent itch to moralize about events, rather than to work to turn those events to the best account. We do not argue with the underlying truth in Mr. Dulles' theory of "brinkmanship," for force is an indispensable instrument in the maintenance of security. *But*, unilateral military intervention, whatever its legal or moral justification, requires practical justification. "Limited war," as Henry Kissinger has commented, "is no better an instrument of policy than the political environment from which it springs and the political goals toward which it leads, and in both these respects . . . our action in Lebanon has been deficient."

The President clings to the excuse that we were, after all, only protecting the "independence" of a small, friendly power. Independence from what, for whom, and for how long? Surely not Lebanese "independence" of the United States; nor "independence" of the Lebanese or Iraqi peoples from rulers in whom they had lost confidence. That would be carrying "independence" too far. The best that can be said for the decision that sent our armed forces into the Middle East is that it is embarrassing and even perilous for a great power to abandon even a bankrupt policy under pressure. But the best excuse is none too good. For with whom have we "saved face"? With President Chamoun. But did our action weaken the influence of Nasser in the Middle East? On the contrary, as sober a judge as military analyst Hanson Baldwin has concluded that

even if a United Nations force takes over in Lebanon, it will find that the forces of Arab nationalism, symbolized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, will be ultimately strengthened—not weakened—by the United States action.

Did our intervention slow down the drive of the Soviet Union in the Middle East? We have yet to hear that said. Did it commend itself to our allies in Western Europe—to General de Gaulle or our dear friend Chancellor Adenauer? Or to non-Communists of India, or

North Africa? How many other passé regimes does this Administration feel honor-bound to save—temporarily—from discard by their own peoples?

What this intervention did *not* accomplish, however, is nothing to what might have happened had it accomplished more. What would have happened if the Lebanese rebels had shown less restraint and several hundred Marines had been shot? To what kind of fighting and over how wide an area and for how long would we have been committed? Were we prepared to march on Cairo? Would we have become engaged in a large-scale holding action, Korea-style? And could such an operation have been kept "conventional"—that is, non-nuclear?

The Administration is not above accepting credit for so promptly and efficiently delivering a small force to Lebanon. "Limited war" champions are supposed to read the lesson that we now have the small-war "capability" these champions have found wanting. But surely we would be foolish to expect that every crisis we get into and in which we find it necessary to deploy military force, will be one of these battalion-a-day crises with no shooting at the journey's end. To deliver what we did in the Middle East, we scraped the bottom of the barrel: Last week, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admitted to the Senate that our ability to airlift troops, despite the achievement in Lebanon, has not increased in recent years. Our limit, they said, is one division, and that without its equipment. They did not specify over what period of time the personnel of that one division could be moved, nor what they might be expected to do upon arrival without their equipment.

Balance Sheet

Where has our action put Mr. Khrushchev? It has given him another dramatic opportunity to star in the role of defender not only of Arab nationalism but of world peace. It is not Soviet "volunteers" or a stepped-up program of arms delivery to Nasser that should worry us: the worry is that we have been acting so as to compel more and more Arabs to choose between ourselves and the Russians.

The stature of President Nasser too has been enhanced and he is likely, as a consequence, to be less amenable to overtures from the West than might have been the case had we played the Middle East game more astutely. Before his holiday on the beach in Yugoslavia, Nasser's dictatorship was embroiled in domestic complications with the Syrian province of his United Arab Republic; its per capita income is more than double that of Egypt, and it was objecting to his tariff policy as well as to the insertion of too many Egyptians into Damascus posts. Such differences were dissolved by common anger at the West. United Arab Republic stock has soared even in Lebanon. The psychology of the situation is summed up in the brief

IN THE NEXT ISSUE

LOUIS J. HALLE

US Policy: The First Problem in the Middle East

C. P. SNOW

Science and Human Values

ALICE B. TOKLAS

The Rue Dauphin Refuses the Revolution

PATRICK O'DONOVAN

Alaskan Portrait


observation of a professor of History of the Near and Middle East at the University of London (Bernard Lewis):

It is the anti-Western policy that commands the widest, readiest, and strongest support in most countries of the Middle East. This was most strikingly demonstrated in September, 1955, when the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was announced. Far more significant than the arms deal itself was the wave of almost ecstatic joy with which the news of it was received all over the Arab world. The Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian Chambers of Deputies at once voted resolutions of congratulations to Colonel Nasser, and almost the entire Arab press greeted the news with exultation and delight.

Further entries on the debit side of the Western ledger may not so immediately appear, but there are some depressing possibilities. May not the Anglo-American rush to act have nipped in the bud a habit, just beginning to develop in the free world, of sending international contingents drawn from all continents to hold the fort at points of danger? Next, will not consequent mistrust of Western motives tilt the balance of contracts and commerce in Asia and Africa at best to "third force" countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan, and at worst to the Soviet Union? Third, is not the nationalization of Middle Eastern oil, and its diversion—as in Iran, into the greatest possible number of foreign hands—hastened by this affair? "Honor" may have been saved, but have our interests been safeguarded by Mr. Eisenhower's action?

Fortunately, the circumstances in Lebanon are unlike those anywhere else and, thanks to their peculiarity, the Lebanese themselves will at some point provide the circumstances for our departure. Lebanon's uniquely diverse religious communities cannot afford to quarrel too hard or their country will fall to pieces—as some of its neighbors, but few Lebanese, would like it to do. Rebellion had reached a stalemate before the Marines arrived; the rebels had not won, but they had already achieved their purpose of preventing President Chamoun, who was too pro-Western for their taste, and, they charged, corrupt, from running for a second term. A UN observer corps—too small and too careful of itself to be wholly effective—was already at work and now will be modestly reinforced. All factions in Lebanon were ready to be cajoled by Ambassador Murphy into finding a new broom and a compromise Presidential candidate.

But in Jordan there is no similar prospect. King Hussein's rare moments of popular acclaim were won by anti-British gestures—the dismissal of Glubb, the renunciation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. His call for British help was an admission of weakness so great that it is hard to imagine the throne's surviving it. Moreover, all Arabs are bound to feel a special antipathy to an airlift that can arrive only across Israel's airspace: any form of Israeli consent or even connivance at once wakens



"Stay right where you are—I'll come to you"

all their classic fears that Israel is not only their enemy but a disguised Western bridgehead. Peer as one may into the Jordanian murk, it is hard to see how the troops King Hussein called in can quit Jordan without exposing him to the very upheaval they came to forestall. The probable end to the story is the collapse of the regime and a joyful entry, willed by a majority of the population, into union with the United Arab Republic.

What can be done now? How do we get out of the ditch? Having over-indulged, the Administration now goes to the UN Sunday School and trusts that in that atmosphere of high purpose, much will be forgiven.

The Role of the UN

Regrettably, however, a parallel is bound to be drawn in the UN and elsewhere between the Anglo-French endeavors to justify their intervention in Suez in terms of principle (recall their claim that they were acting on behalf of the United Nations) and our dependence upon a somewhat forced interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter—which recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if *an armed attack* occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." It is more than awkward that the United Nations Observer team had failed to find evidence of substantial outside intervention in Lebanon before we sent the Marines. We

should not be surprised if a large part of mankind takes as evidence of our hypocrisy the fact, also, that our intervention was timed by events in another country, *i.e.* Iraq; and that after calling a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the crisis we professed to see developing, we did not wait for the meeting before we acted on our own!

How heavily can we safely lean on the United Nations? In the Security Council, the veto provision prevents that body's acting as a guarantor of Western policy. The immediate prospect there is one of permanent deadlock on every major issue where the super-powers, the US and the USSR, are divided. And they are divided on most major issues.

What then of the General Assembly? On matters of substance, a two-thirds vote in the Assembly is needed for action. Either the "Soviet side" or the "Western side" can prevent that two-thirds majority from coming into being. The smaller nations are becoming, at least in the parliamentary procedures of the UN, the decisive power. They may not get their way, but they can block the way of the Soviet Union or the Americans.

The UN's importance, as a host to the diplomats of the world and as a collective instrument for social improvement, is great indeed. But it was never intended as a solvent of great power differences. We anticipate little of lasting or profound value coming out of a "Summit" Security Council meeting at this moment. And that is because we doubt whether the facts of international life are much changed by changing the names and faces of those who sit at the Security Council table. Barring madness in Moscow or Washington, a general war is out of the question. That being so, there are no compelling reasons (compelling to Moscow and Washington) for significant compromises between the super powers on questions which now divide them.

Is this an argument against top-level talks? No. The effort to reach understandings is always worthwhile. And if a Summit meeting gives the Russians a gigantic stage for their propaganda, it gives *us* a forum as well. The

merit, therefore, of a confrontation soon between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower turns largely on what we have to say during the confrontation. We would expect the Soviet spokesman to urge—as the Soviet Government did in the spring of 1957—that the Middle East be "neutralized." Mr. Khrushchev may renew his proposal for an arms embargo and East-West agreement to keep hands-off the Middle East. What this proposal in effect assumes is that if the Soviets can get the West out of the area, Communist take-over from within can be accomplished that much sooner.

Neutralism and "Neutralization"

But the West too is in this game. We must not accept collapse of the Middle East into Communism as inevitable. We have cards to play, but they will take no tricks until there is a basic change of attitude by those in Washington who play them. There must be a more evident appreciation of the fact that *all* nations operate in their own interest—as we do—and that there is nothing moral or immoral in their attempts to profit from an uncommitted status by playing Moscow against Washington. We may think it foolish, we may not like it, but we can have no constructive influence in the Middle East until we accept neutralism as a normal rather than a nasty response of smaller powers to Big Power conflicts.

A changed attitude would allow us to take seriously the ambitions of Arab nationalists to run their own affairs. It would allow us to adjust to the idea that the union of Arab peoples in the Middle East, moved by strong sentiments of Arab nationalism, is not in itself a bad thing. And we would recognize too that the present chaos of weak Arab states, unable to stand by themselves, is not necessarily something worth preserving. We would yield with good temper to the Arab preference for non-alignment with East and West—gambling on their instinct for self-preservation to protect them from Soviet domination.

But does "neutralizing" the area mean unconcern with the fate of the Middle East? If it takes on that meaning, we are lost. The US, in company with other powers willing to be in its company, must help the Arab states to help themselves. The Aswan Dam still needs building. To live with Nasser—not as a father or a brother but as a friend—we will be required to make further offers of economic assistance. We might even invite the Russians to cooperate in sponsoring Eric Johnston's plan for an international authority to exploit the waters of the Jordan and its tributaries for the use of Jordan, Israel, Syria and Lebanon. And for none of this should we demand that any Arab state pay by joining a pact, giving us a base, or singing a hymn against Communism. Nor should we demand that these Arab states guarantee the perpetuation of present arrangements for the exploitation and sale of

ONE CAN THINK *with a certain zest of taking on Mr. Khrushchev . . . of welcoming the competition in foreign aid and urging the Russians to meet us on a matching basis. "We'll provide half the capital for Nile development. Come on, Mr. Khrushchev, what about the other half? You will? Good—we'll do it together through the World Bank. You won't? Well, we understand that Communism isn't yet productive enough, so we'll do it ourselves. Better luck when next we try—which we shall do next year and the year after that and the year after that and on and on until kingdom come. . . ."*

—ADLAI E. STEVENSON
January 31, 1958

Middle Eastern oil. A new and more equitable approach limiting private oil profits must be found, such as that outlined in this issue of *The New Republic*.

An American policy which avoids challenging Pan-Arabism or Nasser need not, we must add, go to the extreme of treating the Arab states as if they were already a single monolithic bloc. Within the Arab world there are differing national interests, and our policy should take these into account so as to strengthen the position of each state in its new relations with Nasser—and with the Soviets. Saudi Arabia, for example, is certain to move closer to Egypt, but how much closer and on what terms will depend to some extent on Saudi-US relations. The new Iraqi government, which we welcomed with a slap but will shortly recognize, provides a better case in point. Baghdad wants close ties with Nasser, but actual affiliation with the UAR is still an open question. There are the oil revenues to think of. The words of Hashim Jawad (page 8), who is here to represent the new regime at the UN, are a clear invitation to Washington to recognize that if Nasser and Egypt are powerful, so is Iraq: "Iraq has special problems with Iran and Turkey that are important to her. . . . The UAR does not have these relationships. We in Iraq must be considerate first of all of our neighbors."

A realistic US policy in the Middle East would gradually de-emphasize the Baghdad Pact rather than permit Pact governments to hurry us into new commitments. This may be our last chance to disengage before there are more damaging *coups* in Pact countries. The positive dangers (emphasized in these pages by Hans J. Morgenthau) in clinging to the Pact and to SEATO should lead us above all to begin to extricate ourselves from our artificially high military commitment to Pakistan.

The Survival of Israel

Finally, now is the moment to speak directly and frankly to the Russians about Israel. For all that we have said about learning to live with Nasser (because there is nothing we can do), we are not for one moment prepared to abandon the moral and legal obligation to see that Israel survives. Neither the national conscience, nor, we suspect, the national interest would be served by surrendering Israel in the hope of winning friends among the Arabs. Mr. Khrushchev may choose, of course, to throw Israel overboard right now. If that is the Russian line, it is well to have it said publicly. For our part, we should urge the Russians to join us and others in a serious attempt to settle the refugee problem. Almost a million Palestine Arabs are existing from day to day—nourished emotionally by their resentments and physically by the meager \$30 million spent annually for their relief by the UN. It is estimated that it would take little more than half a billion dollars to resettle most of the refugees

IF THE DAY IS PAST and gone forever when the Middle East can be stabilized by Western military power, we must seek an accommodation with the new powers in the Middle East—namely with the Soviet Union and with Nasser's confederation. What other line of policy is conceivable? None, unless it can be called a policy to do nothing but dig in where we are in the Lebanon and in Jordan, and for the rest to trade insults with Nasser and Khrushchev. We shall get the worse of the exchange of insults, in that it is always easier to denounce intervention than to defend it.

—WALTER LIPPMANN

July 24, 1958

in Iraq—which is underpopulated and could profitably absorb another million people. If ways could be worked out for cleaning up this festering sore, it is probable that Israeli-Arab boundary differences could then be adjusted. It is not in the final interest of Israel itself that it should take priority over all other issues in the Middle East. If we in the West are driven entirely from that area, having failed to come to terms with its peoples, Israel will suffer greatly; and quite possibly there could arise a most disturbing wave of anti-Semitism (not just anti-Zionism) in our own country. Many bitter pills will have to be swallowed by many people if progress is to be made, but a renewed attempt to achieve a more just settlement of the refugee question and thereafter of boundary disputes now seems to us imperative.

Lebanon was a mistake and the culmination of many mistakes. But there are few finalities in world politics. We can now try to avoid beguiling ourselves with the magic of words—either old words like "Eisenhower Doctrine" or new words like "neutralized." Military non-alignment of the Arab states does not, we repeat, mean non-involvement. No area of the world can be immunized against Communist intrigue and influence—nor—and this is our salvation—against democratic ideas and power. When Ambassador Lodge made his historic declaration that the future of the UN depends upon its ability to deal with "indirect aggression," he brought to the front a central confusion which led us to the aimless intervention in Lebanon. Rebellion in both Lebanon and Iraq, as our contributors point out, is the outcome of local political energies—driven by irrepressible demands for internal reform and divorce from Western domination. To say these internal conflicts are transmuted, as has Mr. Lodge, into "indirect aggression" when outside forces aid and abet one party or another is to suggest that America should intervene 'round the clock and 'round the world wherever local agitation threatens the status quo. The status quo in many parts of the world deserves to go and will go. We are not the master of history: only, at our best, its sympathetic partner.

Conversation with Hashim Jawad of Iraq

[HASHIM JAWAD was Iraq's representative at the United Nations until December of last year when he voted in favor of Greece on the Cyprus question and was recalled to Baghdad. He left Baghdad right after the revolution and is back as the UN representative—as yet unseated—of the new Iraq Republic. Mr. Jawad had been in Baghdad during the revolution and agreed to answer questions about old friends and his knowledge of recent events.]

1. *Many say here that the revolt was inspired by President Nasser and some say it was inspired by the Communists.*

You know that this is not true. The people in Iraq, and Arabs everywhere, know that a revolution must be made by the Army. No one else could do it. No one knew when the revolution would come but the atmosphere was electric in Baghdad.

2. *Why did the revolution occur in July, 1958? Why not sooner?*

There have been plots and discontent in the Army for some years. They have never succeeded or gone very far. A great number of Army officers were retired or transferred when they were suspected. The best estimate was that at least 10,000 secret police were in Baghdad alone. It was hard to make a plot. The opportunity came when General Qasim's brigade was ordered to Jordan. They had then a perfect opportunity. They were to leave on the 14th and so no suspicion was aroused when they traveled about.

3. *The events at the palace seemed unnecessarily bloody to some.*

I assure you that the Army went into the palace to demand a new cabinet and intended the king to be a constitutional monarch. Abdul Ilah ordered the guards to arrest the officers. They had to escape and return to fight it out. The king's body was never touched and Abdul Ilah's was rescued by the army very quickly.

4. *When do you think the chance for peaceful revolution was lost?*

When Nuri Said dissolved the Parliament of 1954 which had an opposition of less than 30 out of 144, people realized that a revolution would be the only answer.

5. *What will happen to those who served with Nuri Said? How many are in jail? Will any of the old politicians be able to participate in national politics?*

Some must be brought to account. Only Nuri Said and Abdul Ilah were really hated. There are some 20 or 30 arrested now. Many prominent politicians who served with Nuri are free. For example, Nadim Pachachi and the former Prime Minister Mouktar Baban. I do not think anyone wants to have any vindictive punishment. A few may be tried. The question of the secret police will certainly be investigated. Some will just retire to private life because they have made illegal profits.

6. *What of the civil service?*

I do not think any or hardly any of the civil service will be changed. They are technicians and are as sympathetic to the revolution as the rest of the country. Certainly people like our friend Ibrahim Alussi, Director of Mines, is a technician and will not be affected.

7. *What of the new government? What will their international policies be?*

The present government is very moderate. The Sovereignty Council is even conservative. General Rubai is a very religious man and Muhammad Kubbah, the head of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, and Naqshabandi are both conservative. The cabinet is representative and you know Muhammad Hadid, the deputy head of Kamil Chaderchi's party, and Joumar the foreign minister and Shanshal the minister of guidance. They are all Iraqis who have opposed Nuri for a long time but are reasonable and moderate men.

I am very interested in having trade unions and other associations. This will give us a chance to progress. Under the old regime there could be no associations of any kind—artistic, cultural, let alone political or trade unions.

8. *What of the oil companies and concessions?*

The oil company has done a very good job in social welfare, workers' housing and vocational training. We expect and hope to obtain greater production but we want the oil company to continue and for the oil to continue to go to the West.

9. *What of foreign policy?*

We want good relations with the US and the West. Also Iraq lives next to Iran and we do much trade with her. Above all we need good relations with our neighbors and we also hope the US will recognize us soon because people will not understand it otherwise.

10. *Will you join the UAR?*

I do not think so at this time. We shall have close relations on many matters—including economic, cultural, foreign and defense policies. Iraq has, as I said, special problems with Iran and Turkey that are important to her. The UAR does not have these relationships. We in Iraq must be considerate first of all of our neighbors.

BUSHROD HOWARD JR.

Iraq's New Rulers

A Political Analysis by Walter Laqueur

THE French General Staff (it used to be said) was always ready for the last war; in 1914 it was prepared for 1870, in 1940 it was ready to fight World War I. It is somewhat disconcerting to find a similar time lag (of roughly a quarter of a century) in Western thinking about the Middle East. Misunderstanding the Middle East is not a recent trend: According to a standard academic joke, the history of the Arabs in Europe has always been written either by Orientalists who knew no history, or by historians who did not know the Orient. At present, Western statesmen (and public opinion in general) in their judgments about the Middle East rely either on their own inspiration or quite frequently on the advice of experts who may be authorities on Islamic law, Sufism or Persian miniatures and a great many other topics of undoubted importance, but who have apparently not been greatly interested in the political and social dynamics of the Middle East—and especially the dynamics of the radical movements that have come to play the central part of the Mideastern scene.

Some of our more thoughtful contemporaries have proclaimed in recent days such newly acquired insights as "Arab nationalism is a strong emotional force that we have neglected" or "Unwilling peoples should not have been forced into the Baghdad pact" or "Something was rotten in Nuri's Iraq." These insights would have been of considerable importance if universally accepted in the late 'thirties; even eight or ten years ago they would have been of some help in unraveling knotty Middle Eastern problems. But whoever expects to save the situation in 1958 merely by "accommodating himself" to nationalism and neutralism in the Near East will be in for rude shocks. Matters are much more complex than that.

The new regime in Iraq offers an almost perfect illustration. Western interests in Iraq (it ought to be stated forthwith) are in no immediate danger. The oil will continue to flow, Iraq promises to honor all its international obligations. Dictatorships that have just acquired power are always on their best behavior; they want to become respectable. Even Hitler, one might recall, respected Germany's obligations for quite a while after January 30, 1933. The decisive question is: What will happen in Iraq 12 or 18 months from now? In that perspective the political prospects are somewhat less rosy.

WALTER LAQUEUR is the author of *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* and the editor of *Middle East in Transition*.

The Iraqi revolution needs explaining on various levels. It was the revenge of the army against Nuri Said who had hanged some of their fellow officers, those who had taken part in the pro-Fascist putsch of 1941. It was a rebellion against the pro-Western orientation of the old government and a demonstration in favor of Arab national socialism or pan-Arabism or Nasserism. It was last and not least a social revolution, or in any case the beginning of one—an old-fashioned, long overdue "bourgeois revolution" (to use Marxist nomenclature).

The opposition brought to power by this revolutionary wave is far from homogenous in character; in Nuri Said's days almost the whole middle class, certainly the entire intelligentsia, belonged to the opposition. Nor was the situation greatly helped by the indiscriminate use of the term "Communist" by Nuri and his henchmen against all their opponents. The former opposition, (*i.e.* the new regime) is divided into four or five groups that will from now on jockey for positions and power. It can be taken for granted that political parties will play a bigger role in Baghdad than in Cairo. The Egyptian officers' coup, was, *inter alia*, a rebellion against traditional parties which had failed and been discredited. In Baghdad on the other hand, the parties had been against the regime, had been suppressed, and thus were bound to share the fruits of victory when the regime was overthrown.



The most prominent of these groups at present is the Istiqlal (Independence) Party; one of its leaders, Muhammad al Kubbah, is a member of the three man Council of Sovereignty; another, Sadiq Shinshal is minister of propaganda. The history of this party tends to show that political definitions such as "Left" and "Right" do not make much sense in the Middle East—and in Asia in general. In the 'thirties and early 'forties the Istiqlal was pro-Fascist; its leaders took part in the Rashid Ali coup in 1941 and spent the subsequent war years either in Nazi Germany or in British prisons. After the defeat of the Berlin-Rome Axis the leaders of the Istiqlal were very much impressed by the increase in Soviet strength, adopted a neutralist stand and began closely to collaborate with pro-Soviet forces in Iraq. None of their leading members could be defined as even moderately left-wing with regard to domestic policy; but they all are firmly convinced that the Soviet Union is to prevail over the West in the global struggle—and they prefer not to be on what they think is the losing side. The Istiqlal

had comparatively many sympathizers in the officer corps which explains its present prominence. Its organization, however, is weak, its program vague, and there is much reason to assume that before long it will be swept aside by more radical forces. (The only distinct point in the Istiqlal's socio-economic program is the demand to nationalize *foreign* companies.)

On the so-called "Left," the influence of the old National Democratic Party has decreased in recent years whereas the Ba'th (Renaissance) Party led by Abdur Rahman al Bazaz, dean of the law school of Baghdad University, has gained in strength. (Practically everybody of importance on the Iraqi "Left" is a lawyer by profession; quite a few are former students of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics.) The National Democratic Party was originally founded by Kamel al Chaderchi in the middle 'thirties and was mildly socialist, "Fabian," or as they then defined themselves "Populist," in outlook. Since 1945, however, this party has been largely infiltrated by Communists, who used it as a front organization while their own party was underground. Chaderchi's position today is perhaps not unlike that of Pietro Nenni in Italy; he may want to follow an independent line, but the party apparatus (or what is left of it) is no more in his hands. One of Chaderchi's former lieutenants, Muhammad Hadid, is minister of commerce in the new regime. The Ba'th group—a branch of the All-Arab movement of the same name—is more independent. It combines a somewhat pro-Soviet neutralism with radical pan-Arab slogans and nebulous Socialist demands. Its influence is strong among the intelligentsia but it has few other supporters. In view of its close ties with Syria and the support it receives from Nasser, the Ba'th will presumably share power in Baghdad.

There is yet another "left-wing" group, headed by Tewfik Munir and Aziz Sharif, two prominent Baghdad lawyers; its main function was to serve as a respectable front for the Communists. (Which is perhaps an oversimplification for both Sharif and Munir had their occasional quarrels with the Iraqi CP on tactics.) This group, too, has Colonel Nasser's blessing, and it may be taken that it has already resumed its activities.



Finally, there is the Iraqi Communist Party, ridden for many years by internal dissension and fractional disputes. At present, it has three different leaderships; the old Politburo (headed by Baha ad Din Nuri—in prison since 1953); the new leadership that continued the struggle underground; and lastly the leaders (under Tariq Muhammad) who had fled, or were sent, to Eastern Europe and who helped organize Communist activities from abroad. It remains to be seen whether these various groups will be able to collaborate more smoothly than in the past. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Communists stand a good chance of emerging within a year or so as the

strongest single party, for reasons similar to the swift rise of the Communists in Indonesia—or in Syria in recent years. One of the reasons is their internal organization, which is much superior to that of the other parties; their political program is much clearer, and in a way more practical; their influence is not restricted to the intelligentsia but they have also a "mass basis" in the trade unions and among the minorities (Kurds etc.). Finally, the great prestige of the Soviet Union is conducive to a popular (or national) front climate. If the evidence elsewhere in the Arab world is relevant here, the Communists will not appear as a contestant for power in Iraq at present. They will try instead to gain as much influence as possible inside the national movement.



All this may be a year, possibly more, in coming about. Meanwhile there are several more urgent questions. I have already mentioned the reasons that make civilian participation in the new Iraqi government more likely than in Egypt; the Iraqi officer corps may not want to give up power, but its leaders will certainly continue to rely on their civilian advisers and it is at this juncture that the political parties enter the picture. Some form of federal union between Iraq and the United Arab Republic seems probable, though as complete union as the Syrian leaders wanted, appears unlikely at present. (The willingness—or reluctance—of the new rulers to share their oil revenues with the UAR will be extremely revealing in this context.)

If the Iraqi upheaval had occurred 10, or even five years ago, it could have had some beneficial effect—serving as writing on the wall for some of Iraq's neighbors who refused to introduce political and social reforms. It is doubtful whether at this late hour anything could or should be done to stave off social and political revolution in Jordan—or Iran. For while the Shah goes on collecting air hostesses and King Hussein sport cars, the internal situation in their countries remains uncomfortably similar to that in Iraq before the recent events, or, to that in Egypt—before July, 1952. (The situation in Lebanon admittedly is quite different.) There is next to nothing the West can do about this state of affairs; armed intervention with 600,000 men could conceivably make sense, the dispatch of 6,000 hardly does. Nor is the optimism well founded of the supporters of pan-Arabism in the West, of those who believe that Colonel Nasser and his movement can be neutralized (if not won over) by sympathy, dollars and a re-division of the Middle East. The striking successes of Arab national socialism as headed by Colonel Nasser has blinded many Western observers with regard to its inner weaknesses. This movement has succeeded in compelling the West to re-think many Middle Eastern problems. But impressing the West is one thing and solving the problems of the Arab world another and more difficult task.

What Was Gained By Intervention?

London

ON THE NIGHT President Eisenhower decided to land troops in the Lebanon, Prime Minister Macmillan made a curious statement at a meeting in London about Anglo-American relations. He said: "It is better to be wrong together than right separately." The British Government made it clear from the beginning that it intervened in Jordan only with the greatest misgiving. Even on the extreme right-wing of the Conservative Party there is none of the chauvinist hysteria which greeted the Suez adventure. And now that events have proved its misgivings to be wholly justified, the government is casting about for some way of escaping from self-imposed catastrophe with the minimum loss of face.

The two leading moderates in the Conservative Government, R. A. Butler, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Heathcote-Amory, have made public speeches in which they present the Anglo-American interventions, not as a return to the policies of Suez, but as a desperate attempt to gain "just that extra breathing-space, in company with the United States Administration, not for imposing our will on nationalism in the Middle East, but for living with it."

For it is now clear to the whole world that military intervention in the Middle East has united all the Arabs behind Colonel Nasser, and Nasser behind Khrushchev. What is especially tragic is that the interventions took place just at the moment when Nasser was flouting Khrushchev by his visit to Yugoslavia, and when the revolution in Iraq had produced a government which, unlike that of Nuri es-Said, had had some chance of offering pan-Arabism an alternative to the monopolistic leadership of Colonel Nasser. Having been caught napping by the revolution in Baghdad, the Anglo-Saxon powers compounded their error by making no attempt to find out who the revolutionaries were before deciding they were bad. Mr. Cabot Lodge denounced them as Communists in the Security Council, and talked of them dragging the dead body of the former Iraqi delegate to the UN through the streets (which later turned out to be untrue—Fadhil al-Jamali had been jailed but not killed). In fact at least half of the revolutionaries are as friendly to the West as was Nuri himself. In London all but two of the members of the Iraqi Embassy have declared their allegiance to the revolutionary government; in Washington all members of the Embassy have pledged support.

In Beirut, a majority of Parliament wants the Americans to leave, and the Lebanese Army has threatened to

fight the Marines if they make themselves too conspicuous. In Jordan, British troops have been forbidden to enter the capital for fear of provoking the revolution their arrival was supposed to prevent. And the young King has already announced his intention of breaking the agreement on which Britain agreed to send him troops, by attempting to march against Baghdad.

The only rational ground for intervention in Lebanon and Jordan was to fortify the confidence of other Arab governments which have committed themselves to the West. But the result has been to increase the pressure of anti-Western feeling to such an extent that even the most pro-Western rulers are compelled to seek terms from Colonel Nasser. America has been unable to fly oil to Jordan from the Persian Gulf because Saudi Arabia refuses passage for American planes and the oil workers at Bahrain refuse to load the oil. And the greatest blow of all, to Britain, is that the Sultan of Kuwait has for the first time sought an interview with Colonel Nasser. In Libya, Britain has had to land troops she intended for Jordan in an attempt to save the pro-British King from overthrow. Morocco has declared its solidarity with the rest of the Arabs in opposing the intervention. Tunisia has recognized the new government in Iraq.



All these results were predictable—indeed they had been predicted even by the British and American officials most concerned, before the *coup d'état* in Iraq threw sanity to the winds. Of all the Western allies in NATO, only Turkey supported the intervention with enthusiasm—and now Turkey is disgusted because the West is not prepared to carry the intervention further into Cairo and Baghdad! The only thing which might have rallied support to the British and American Governments would have been direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East. But Khrushchev has played his cards with the *sang-froid* which was once considered British. His invitation to Summit talks on the Middle East has given him the best possible position in the crisis, however the West responds.

Washington and London must now face the fact that there is no way of turning their intervention to good account. The best they can hope for is a face-saving compromise which will leave their position still a great deal worse than before. But what is most important is that they should finally recognize that the policy behind their intervention has now been demonstrated as a total loss. There is an alternative Western policy for the Middle East which consists in meeting Arab nationalism half way and seeking agreement with the Soviet Union on the military neutrality of the Arab world. It is not too late even now to face the facts of life in the Middle East. Britain and America may be lying in the last ditch—but they are under no compulsion to die in it.

DENIS HEALEY

If There Were No Nasser...

Cairo

REACTIONS in Cairo to the events of the past two weeks have been relatively mild. Whereas Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, and Jerusalem were for varying periods of time cut off from air communication with the rest of the world, life here so far seems calm and almost unaffected by the upheavals. In Damascus, capital of the United Arab Republic's northern province, Americans were warned by their consular officials to leave the country: it was considered dangerous to be found wandering among the heavily armed "popular forces" which have been celebrating the latest victory of Arab nationalism. But here in the capital of the UAR, a group of American students who fled from Damascus are continuing their Middle East excursion undisturbed by the turmoil in other Arab world centers to which they may not for the moment travel.

Although there have been no mass demonstrations celebrating the victory in Iraq, or against the "imperialist" invasions of Lebanon and Jordan; although business and commercial life and communications with the outside except for the isolated Arab capitals, is continuing normally, this does not mean that there has been no reaction to "the crisis." It monopolizes most discussion of store clerks, journalists, government officials, or members of the plush Gezira Sporting Club. The subject commands the greater part of the daily press, and nearly all editorials during the past week have commented on nothing else.

The most authoritative statements—those which set the cue for public commentary on international politics—are those of President Nasser. After his arrival in Damascus from Moscow, Nasser made two speeches. Both were morale builders, apparently intended to maintain popular enthusiasm rather than to indicate any clear lines of policy to be pursued by the UAR in the near- or long-range future. Both congratulated the people of Iraq on their victory against "injustice and imperialism." The revolution there was considered a victory for the whole "Arab nation" which "struggled long to achieve freedom and independence." The battle was against "imperialism from without and tyranny from within." Both the President's speeches and the newspaper commentaries described the American occupation as "aimed at killing you and your fathers by steel and fire." Two years ago, said Nasser, Britain and France "were deceiving and misleading the world. They even resorted to forgery. . . . Today, my brethren, the same farce is being repeated . . .

and it has been uncovered to the whole world in the same way the 1956 plot was."

In the light of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's report that there was little if any evidence of foreign assistance to the Lebanese rebels, or "peoples forces" as they are called here, US Ambassador Raymond Hare's oral statement to Acting UAR Foreign Minister Aly Sabry was regarded as especially invidious. Hare informed the minister that US landings were at the request of the Lebanese Government and that the forces would be withdrawn as soon as "circumstances permitted." Then Hare warned that "in case the American forces are attacked by the United Arab Republic forces or by any elements which the American Government considers to be inspired by the United Arab Republic or by orders from it, there will be a risk of this problem increasing in magnitude and our relations with the United Arab Republic will be greatly affected." Ambassador Hare's verbal note was regarded as another of the "threats being directed against the UAR by the US and the other Western powers." Some government officials to whom I talked called it an "ultimatum."

At any rate, it probably served no useful purpose in view of Mr. Hammarskjöld's previous comments, and has done little to help create an atmosphere conducive to any satisfactory relations with the West.

Evaluations of American policy are of course colored by the vaguely socialist orientation of the regime in Cairo. It sees the hand of "American oil monopolies" manipulating decisions behind the scenes in Washington. In a discussion with one of Nasser's political advisors, I attempted to explain the complex of pressures which come to bear on the formation of major American policy decisions. Even the oil interests, I explained, are divided in their outlook on foreign policy between the foreign and the domestic producers. At the end of the discussion I was told that, after all, one must admit, it is the foreign oil producers who really control American Middle East policy. Today even Zionist influences are considered of secondary importance to those of "big business."



There is not only resentment, but fear, of the lengths to which many UAR officials believe "American imperialism" will go to establish itself in the Middle East. Many, including President Nasser, have read Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which they view as either official or semi-official US policy—one liable to involve small nations along the Soviet periphery in another Korea-like war.

The long-range American objective in the area is believed to be displacement of the British. In an article by one of the President's associates which has just appeared in the weekly magazine of the police force, the author maintains that Anthony Eden, fearing the growth of

American competition, staged Suez to snatch the area from US imperialists. They blocked his attempt, and now the Americans are making a direct play for hegemony. However, warns the author, Arab nationalism and the will of "the people" will overcome all such attempts.

Nuri Said, Camille Chamoun and King Hussein of Jordan are compared in Cairo to Quislings because of their collaboration with "American imperialism." I have met not only youthful and enthusiastic Arab nationalists, but responsible government officials of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon who were considered to be in the "anti-Nasser" camp, who now foresee and are eager for changes such as those which have occurred in Iraq.

Although Nasser is in large measure responsible for the revolutions in Iraq and Lebanon, his responsibility is not direct. It is true that the uprisings would probably not have occurred had there been no such catalytic agent as Nasser and the UAR, but it was not the catalyst which caused the explosions. Conditions were ripe for upheaval in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. President Chamoun has been an unpopular figure since the elections there last year. Since then both opposition and government forces have been stacking arms for a showdown, procuring weapons where available. Until a few weeks ago, the struggle in Lebanon was not between pro-Western and anti-Western, or between pro-Muslim and pro-Christian, or even between pro- and anti-Nasser groups, but between the "ins" and the "outs." In the opposition there were many leaders who have been skeptical of the UAR's dominant position in the Arab east. Many were not Muslim and many, like Fuad Ammoun and Kemal Jumblatt were more sympathetic to a pro-Western orientation than to a neutralist, and certainly a Communist orientation. But attempts to over-simplify issues have forced many to choose between the UAR and the USA.



As is becoming more generally understood, revolution had been smouldering in Iraq since long before the 1952 coup in Egypt. Despite the dedication of about 70 percent of the country's oil royalties to development projects in recent years, terrible economic and social conditions continued to fester. The rich have grown richer, and the poor more poverty stricken. In the last half-dozen years one of the world's most horrible slum areas grew up on the outskirts of rapidly modernizing Baghdad. There, sprawled for miles and miles between the mud wall which protects the capital from flood and the banks of the mighty Tigris, live tens of thousands of refugees from landlordism in southern Iraq. A recent visitor described one such slum of 40,000 mud hut dwellers adjoining the sewage dumps in these words:

There is much trachoma and dysentery, but no bilharzia or malaria because the water is too polluted for snails or mosquitoes. . . . A woman has a 50-50 chance of raising a child to the age of 10. There are no social

services of any kind. . . . Earnings of the poorest average 100 fils [about 25 cents] a day. On the adjacent dumps dogs with rabies dig in the sewage, and the slum-dwellers pack it for re-sale as garden manure.

Social and economic conditions in Jordan, although not as appalling as those in landlord-ridden Iraq, are no credit to the West. There, where one-third of the total population are Palestine Arab refugees, the government is befouled with nepotism and corruption. Only recently, plans were formulated for reform, but will they leave the planners' drafting boards before revolution overthrows the government?



At this hour, those political forces in the area which most sensitively reflect the popular desire for social and economic change are those aligned against America. They are usually neutralist in their international outlook, republican reformist in sentiment—although they are not always successful in their attempts to implement the reforms which they proclaim.

Officials in Cairo are not unaware of the dilemma facing the US. Although there will be many fiery public statements and press editorials, there is great fear of spreading a military conflict. Authorities here would be satisfied with a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops and their replacement in Lebanon by a strengthened UN observer group supplemented by such "additional measures" as Secretary General Hammarskjöld may recommend. What to do about Jordan will have to be decided later.

Last Saturday's *Egyptian Mail* gave some indication of what Arab nationalist leaders expect in the long run. The present situation, commented the paper's editorial, was caused by US "refusal to work with those who represent the people of the Arab world—refusal, above all, to cooperate with President Gamal Abdul Nasser of the United Arab Republic from whom the rest of the Arabs, automatically, take their cue. They take their cue from him because he represents the success of Arab nationalism. But if he did not exist, there are plenty of other 'Nassers' in the Middle East to fill the gap."

Obviously there are many aspects of the Nasser regime which the United States cannot approve. But does this mean that we must involve ourselves in direct conflict with Arab nationalism? A long-range *modus vivendi* could be established on the basis of support for those aspects of Arab nationalism which are directed at economic and social progress and backing for those of its leaders—such as Mohammed Hadid in Iraq—who are progressive and democratically minded.

DON PERETZ

MR. PERETZ is author of the recent *Middle East Institute* book *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* and was until recently a staff consultant to the American Jewish Committee.

The Lebanese Disaster

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

IT IS AN odd experience to think and write on a momentous event in American foreign policy after being cut off for nearly a month from all meaningful contact with foreign policy. Having lived in recent weeks in different parts of Wyoming, limited to the newspapers of the region which are local in the sense our neighborhood weeklies are and to radio and television programs selected by local stations in view of local interests, I am struck by the isolation from what is going on in the world, in which the inhabitants of this region year-in and year-out live. This is not isolationism as a policy; this is isolation as a fact of life.

Yet in a sense this is also a fascinating experience. For the first time as far as I can remember, I am all by myself in having to make up my mind about a momentous contemporary event. The wisdom of Walter Lippmann is lost to me; James Reston cannot help me with lines to read between; the inflection in Ed Murrow's voice does not beckon me to turn in the direction all good men must turn. I know nothing about the mood of the nation nor of the climate of opinion in Washington. No research assistant provides me with historic analogies; no punch card checks my facts; nobody and nothing reassures me. The temptation to trim one's sails to the prevailing wind or else to sail against it does not need to be resisted; for there is no way of telling which way the wind blows. Nothing stands between the observer's mind and the facts, and the observer has nothing to go on except the bare facts of the situation and the resources of his mind.

Thus I find the intervention of the United States and Great Britain in the Middle East both inevitable under the circumstances and a national disaster. To speak of America alone, this intervention has been made inevit-

able by the policies we have pursued, and the commitments we have entered into, in the Middle East. Our policy has been to defend the status quo in the Middle East by supporting as allies those states which would accept our support, and both the commitments of the Baghdad Pact and of the Eisenhower Doctrine serve to implement that policy. It is the unsoundness of that policy which makes any attempt to implement it by unilateral military action a self-defeating enterprise, fraught with terrible dangers. For, as we might have learned from Metternich's experience more than a century ago, a policy of the status quo is sound only when it seeks to defend a status quo viable in itself. The defense of Western Europe is such a policy; for the vitality of the nations of Western Europe provides the indigenous element necessary for the defense of the existing distribution of power, guaranteed by the support of the US.

What exists in Western Europe is totally absent in the Middle East. None of the "nations" of the Middle East to whose defense we are committed is a viable political or military entity. Far from being the creatures of their own organic growth or of a sudden surge of inner strength, they are but the artifacts of the aspirations and rivalries of foreign powers. Where in any of these "nations" are the prerequisites of nationhood? What are the historic antecedents which would entitle the present territories of Lebanon or Jordan to house a nation? Is Jordan a nation—whose king dares entrust his life only to White Russian bodyguards, who during the last year has lost two chiefs of staff by desertion to Syria, who, after expelling British power two years ago, must now call it back to save his life and throne? The truth is that those "nations" are not nations at all. They cannot exist without an outside power supporting them. In the past, Great Britain and France supported them as semi-colonial dependencies, taking a last fling at colonial control. With the collapse of British and French power in the Middle East, which the Suez debacle of 1956 both consummated and made manifest, those "nations" became like ripe fruit, waiting for somebody else to pluck them. Has the United States chosen to succeed France in Lebanon and to support the resumption of Britain's traditional role in Jordan? If this is what it is trying to do—and it is impossible to say what else it could be—then the United States is up against a force before which European colonialism had had to retreat when that force stood alone, and which is now supported by the power of the

HANS J. MORGENTHAU directs the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago. His books include *Politics Among Nations* and *In Defense of the National Interest*. In his most recent article in *The New Republic* ("The Decline of American Government," December 16, 1957) he wrote: "The world cries out for transformations commensurate in their revolutionary novelty with the revolutions that threaten it; it cries out for political imagination, audacity and the risky experiment. What we are offering is nothing but stagnation, masquerading in the garb of a utopian conservatism . . . Of the failures which are likely to be in store for us, we have only had a partial glimpse."

Soviet Union. That force is Arab nationalism, and for it the artificial boundaries of Arab "nations" are meaningless.

This being the background of the problem that confronts the United States, it is impossible to visualize a contingency under which the Marines could ever be withdrawn from Lebanon short of a radical revision of the basic assumptions and objectives of American policy in the Middle East. For obviously what threatens the present regime of Lebanon and the existence of the state itself is not an isolated act of outside intervention which can be frustrated by a show of military force. Nor is it Communist subversion; for after all, regimes have been overthrown and kings deposed and assassinated before Communism was ever heard of, and Arab nationalism uses Communism, as it is used by it, but the two movements are not identical. What threatens Lebanon is its congenital inner weakness, made acute by the simultaneous collapse of Western influence and power in the Middle East, the rise of Arab nationalism, and the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Middle East as a major factor. How are the Marines going to supply that inner vitality without which a state must become either the client of a stronger power or be absorbed by it? To land Marines in Lebanon was easy; how to create conditions in Lebanon which will allow us to get them out again is not only difficult, but appears to be an impossible task.

Yet even if it were in the interest of the United States to frustrate the designs of Arab nationalism even by force of arms, is it likely that military intervention in Lebanon will serve that purpose? The symbol and the driving force of Arab nationalism is Nasser of Egypt. How is the prestige of Nasser to be diminished and the attraction of his cause to be impaired by sending the Marines to Lebanon? Will both not rise to unprecedented heights by virtue of that very action? The answers to these rhetorical questions cannot be doubted. When Great Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt in 1956, they struck indeed at the heart of the trouble. Whatever else may be said against the wisdom of this action and, more particularly, against the manner of its execution, that action at least aimed at the right target and in that respect appears to have been inspired by one sound political judgment which is missing in ours.

Our action, then, is politically deficient even in terms of the over-all policy that has made it inevitable; for it has led us into a political blind alley, with only the United Nations or the Soviet Union, that is, the policies of other nations, to extricate us. This is a miserable position for a great nation to be in: to embark upon a policy which leads nowhere and then to have to try to maneuver other nations into policies which will at least prevent the debacle of one's own policy from becoming too obvious by opening up the possibility of retreat.

But this is not all and it is not even the worst that must

be said about our intervention in Lebanon. Through the instrument of that policy we have already inflicted upon ourselves a defeat in the struggle for the minds of men greater than any which the Soviet Union could ever have hoped to inflict upon us by its own policy. The attitude which Japan and Sweden have taken in the Security Council and whatever other news about the reaction of foreign countries I could find indicate how unpopular our action is and to what an extent it has impaired the standing of the United States among the nations of the world.

This reaction in itself would not be necessarily a valid argument against our action if only that action were politically sound. Mr. Dulles is most certainly right when he insists that the United States is not engaged in a popularity contest throughout the world. A great nation has interests which it must defend at any price, and loss of popularity is by no means the highest price which it must be willing to pay. However, the benefits to be expected from such a policy must be worth the price to be paid. Yet where are the benefits to be expected from the policy upon which we have embarked? And if there should be any, are they likely to outweigh the loss which is already obvious?

That loss is, alas, not limited to our position in the struggle for the minds of men. More serious than any argument we have advanced thus far is the fact that our intervention in Lebanon increases the risk of a third world war. The readers of this journal do not need to be reminded of my conviction that the United States has interests which may compel it in certain circumstances to take such a risk. I would not in the fall of 1956 have washed my hands of the fate of Hungary, nor would I have destroyed the last vestige of British and French influence in the Middle East in order to save Nasser. Yet the interests at stake must be of overriding importance in order to justify such a risk, and the risk must be taken under circumstances most likely to minimize it.

THE intervention in Lebanon fails both these tests. That intervention has no rational connection with our vital interests, being—as I have tried to show—the inevitable result of a mistaken policy. Furthermore, it challenges the Soviet Union under circumstances which minimize our political and military strength and maximize that of the Soviet Union—under circumstances which make it virtually impossible for the latter to refuse to take up the challenge. Given our political and military weakness in this self-chosen theatre of operations we have provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity, which it must be expected to exploit fully, either of dealing us a defeat of the first order or of engaging us by proxy in a costly limited war which can have neither a rational political nor military aim. In the end we will be faced with three choices, each disastrous in a different way: either we will have to beat an ignominious retreat, or

we will have to waste our human and material resources in a senseless war, or we will have to transform such a war into the ultimate cataclysm of a third world war.

However, while these are the choices which our present over-all policy appears to leave open to us, there is still another choice, which we should have taken long ago, and that is to scrap altogether a policy whose consistent application has had such disastrous results. What is happening in the Middle East is but a particularly disastrous consequence of an over-all policy which sooner or later is bound to have similarly disastrous consequences elsewhere. What the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine have achieved in the Middle East, SEATO may well achieve one of these days in Southeast Asia. Committed as we are through these and similar undertakings to the defense of interests which are not necessarily our own and to the maintenance of a status quo which is not necessarily viable, we are bound to be faced with contingencies in which we either must go back on our word or else risk expanding our blood and treasure in enterprises either far removed from our real interests or else incapable of successful conclusion. The echo of those grandiloquent words and the shadow of those big gestures will come back to haunt us as they haunt us today in the Middle East.

How many more lessons must we learn, if time will be given us to learn any more, in order to understand that there is a difference between a heroic posture which may be good news for tomorrow's editorial and the next elections, and a foreign policy which commits a nation—its blood, its treasure, its very existence—for an indefinite future? How long shall we allow platitudes about the independence of small nations to obscure the obvious fact that most of the new nations of Asia and Africa do not constitute viable political and military entities and therefore offer a standing invitation to stronger powers to take over? When are we going to realize that there is a golden mean between Washington's injunction against "entangling alliances" and the collector's approach to alliances—the more the better regardless of interests and power—which we have practiced in recent years and which allows Lebanon to force us through an "ultimatum" into most risky action? How long are we going to continue to accept as a substitute for thought that primitive and vulgar devil theory which, in imitation of Nazi and Communist thought processes, attributes every disturbance anywhere in the world to a Communist conspiracy masterminded in Moscow? How much time have we left to learn that the introduction of the Cold War into the Middle East through the Baghdad Pact—playing one Arab state against the other in order to collect a few more useless and costly allies—has been a self-defeating policy, opening the door for the Soviet Union and enlarging if not opening a wound which that policy is unable to close? In other words, is it not high time to look at the Middle

East as it existed before the Baghdad Pact and in the light of a radically revised over-all orientation of our foreign policy?

Such a new departure of our Middle Eastern policy must start with the recognition of certain fundamental facts. The first of these facts is the inevitability of Arab nationalism, owing nothing in its existence to Communism, which might have been destroyed in 1956 at its Egyptian source but against which the individual Arab states cannot be defended through Western military intervention. An Arab government, accepting or seeking Western support, signs its own death-warrant as traitor to the cause of Arab nationalism.

The second fundamental fact, which we have been trying to ignore, is the Russian presence in the Middle East. While our own policies are largely responsible for that presence, we only add new errors to old if we continue to refuse to face up to the unpleasant consequences of our actions.

The third fundamental fact to be recognized is the absence of any vital interests on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The United States seeks stability both for stability's sake and in order to assure the flow of Arab oil to Western Europe. Let it be said in passing that American policy, in curious contrast to the policy of the oil companies, is in the habit of enormously exaggerating European dependence upon Arab oil and similarly underplaying Arab dependence upon European markets; for while Europe has alternative sources of supply, the Arab states have no alternative markets. Arab oil must flow west, or it will not flow at all. The Soviet Union seeks disorder for disorder's sake as a weapon in the Cold War. The pursuit of these policies has brought the two super powers closer to the brink of a third world war than they have ever been before. Might they not have learned that the possible results for either side of the competition for power in the Middle East are not worth the price which disorder in the Middle East might impose upon both of them?

IN view of the absence of vital interests engaged in the Middle East on either side, I have always believed—and there are men high in the councils of our government who share this belief—that the Middle East offers a natural opportunity for a negotiated settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a settlement would require of the United States and the Soviet Union a retreat to the position they occupied before they made the Middle East a battlefield in the Cold War by trying to line up the Arab states on either side. Such a settlement would then have to create a new status quo in the Middle East viable within itself and therefore susceptible to outside support. Such support would have to be provided by the United States and the Soviet Union working together in limiting the range of Arab nationalism under

Egyptian leadership to the Arab peninsula, beyond which it could expand only with outside aid. Such a settlement would be enforced by the realization on either side that a drastic disturbance of the Middle Eastern status quo would constitute an equal threat to the vital interests of both by confronting both, as does the present disturbance, with the risk of a third world war.

If this analysis is correct then it was a mistake on our part to reject out of hand the Russian offers, made re-

peatedly in recent years, to negotiate a settlement of the Middle Eastern issues. While these lines are being written, the papers report another Russian proposal for such a settlement. In view of the disastrous consequences of the policies the United States has pursued thus far in the Middle East, it would be the height of folly to approach such negotiations with the same untenable assumptions and objectives which are responsible for the disaster which our Middle Eastern policy faces today.

AN ARAB'S APPEAL TO HIS STEED

King Hussein of Jordan, after expelling Glubb Pasha, applies to Britain for assistance.

MY English steed! my English steed! that stoodest meekly by,
When banished from my presence with a cold, ungracious eye,
Fail not to canter to my side with all convenient speed,
For since I spurned thee from my sight, I'm sold, my English steed.
Although upon thy willing back I'd travelled far and long,
I with thy services dispensed—I own I did thee wrong;
We said farewell forever then, but if the truth be told,
I now have need of thee again; I'm sold, my steed, I'm sold.

An Arab king, they said, must spur a horse of Arab race,
Another I promoted to thy stable and thy place,
I sprang into the saddle but my steed began to bolt,
I snuffed the breezy desert wind and scented a revolt.
For monarchs in Arabia it's fatal to dismount,
A king without a steed became a thing of no account;
The ties of brotherhood are strong, but stronger fraud and force,
So now I cry to thee "Return! my kingdom for a horse!"

I know without my English steed I'd topple from my throne,
And if I do not ride on thee I dare not ride alone;
I know I kicked thee out lest thou shouldst curb my royal rule,
I know I'm what we called a twerp at Harrow, mine old school,
I know that thou didst always pay for thine own bed and feed,
And now I yearn to have thee back—return, my English steed!
Recall I lodged thee at my court, ere thou wast shown the door,
Recall I made thee Pasha, which horse never was before.

What shall I do without thee, though thou'rt not of Arab blood?
And if thou canst not come, supply another of thy stud,
Another battle charger both reliable and fleet
Whom I will give the privilege to bear my kingly seat.
Who said that I had given thee up? who said that thou wert fired?
Tis false, 'tis false! thy services are urgently required.
Who said that I was sold? I'm not, if thou my plea wilt heed—
Thou dost? Thou hast? Thou wilt? Away! I'm saved, my English steed!

SAGITTARIUS

Goodbye To A Dollar a Barrel

A Proposal for a New Oil Policy in the Middle East

WHAT Mr. Dulles and Mr. Lloyd have apparently agreed upon is a policy of encouraging the development of independent Arab states that will be free to continue oil commerce between the Middle East and the West. The British have made clear to the Soviet Union in the past . . . that this is essential to the security of Britain and that Britain will fight, if necessary, to prevent those oil resources from being denied to Britain by a hostile power. The new factor is that the United States is now apparently backing that policy.

—JAMES RESTON, *The New York Times*, July 21.

THE Western governments say that they are interested in using oil and other raw material resources in this area of the world. But the nations of this area do not deny this opportunity to the Western powers. They demand only one thing: that this problem should be solved on an equitable and mutually profitable commercial basis—which is the most reasonable principle.

—NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, *Message to President Eisenhower*, July 20.

by BUSHROD HOWARD, JR.

IN MY OPINION it is not yet too late to win Arab agreement on equitable terms for a guaranteed flow of oil to the West. But it is indeed too late for any lasting agreement based on the old definition of "equitable." Do we want to assure a place for Western oil companies in the Middle East? Do we want to avoid economic blackmail at the hands of Arab governments? Then far-reaching and fundamental reforms are necessary in the oil companies' pricing policies and patterns of corporate organization. What Arab leaders—including the new Iraqi regime—are saying publicly and privately has reinforced my belief that most Middle East leaders would presently accept, in their own interest,

Before his recent return to the United States lawyer BUSHROD HOWARD, JR. headed the Middle East legal department of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Tripoli (1948-52) and had responsibilities for government and concessionary relations for Socony Mobil Oil (1952-57). He represented Socony Mobil Oil on missions at the United Nations and was an observer at the first London conference on Suez in August, 1956. Since 1957 he has served as a consultant to the Middle East Institute and to various oil companies in Washington.

long-term arrangements conceding a place to the oil companies in the Middle East—providing the companies can be made to accept important changes in their relations with each of the Arab governments.

The need for reform turns on two facts: eight private oil firms, five of them American, are today free to put unconscionable prices on—and take unconscionable profits from—Middle East oil without answering to any public authority; and, most of these firms are vast international combines embracing companies and interests spread over a number of rival countries.

Let us consider why these facts are so crucial; what workable reforms should, as a consequence, be considered, and why these reforms are preconditions for any successful Middle East regional development.

I. A PRICE ARBITRATION PLAN

At the outset it is necessary to dispose of the often-heard argument that the West can, after all, call the tune in the Middle East insofar as oil is concerned. *Fortune* Magazine, for example, recently assured its readers that "the Middle East must do business with the West, for


only the West can use and pay for its oil." Most reassuring! But such statements ignore the uncontested fact that *the West has no substitute for Middle East oil*. Europe and much of Asia must either get their oil from that area or they will not get oil in the amounts needed. Even if the Western hemisphere could supply Europe for more than an emergency period, which is doubtful, the price would be bankruptcy: the cost to Europe for its oil would at least double. To say, therefore, that the Middle East *must* do business with the West is the equivalent of saying that monopoly *must* sell to consumers. It is true in one sense, but the unanswered question—and crucial one—is *under what conditions and at what price?*

The Middle East has 170 billion barrels of proved reserves which were discovered by drilling less than 1,500 oil wells. (By comparison, the US drilled 1,638,000 oil wells to discover 94 billion barrels, of which all but 30 billion barrels have been consumed.) Today, the sheikdom of Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf has 60 billion barrels of proved oil reserves—*twice as much as the United States*. But such figures are not the sum of the oil deposits in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, for the Middle East seems to be an almost unique geologic province. There, marine sedimentary deposits, which are the ones that produce oil, lie in great depth and are combined with large, relatively unbroken foldings which result in accumulations of oil that measure 10 to 150 miles in length and that contain 5 to 30 billion barrels of oil. Although there are encouraging indications that major discoveries may be made elsewhere, nota-

bly the Sahara and off-shore US, the chairman of a major American oil company expressed the universal belief of oil experts in saying that "... on the basis of nearly a century of experience the odds against finding another oil province on this earth comparable to that around the Persian Gulf are too great to make such a hope a sound basis for the free world's long-range planning."

Presently, this oil "province" is being exploited by eight major international companies: Standard Oil (New Jersey), Standard Oil (California), Texas, Gulf, Socony; and, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, (55 percent controlled by the British Treasury), and Compagnie Française des Petroles (the French Government Company). The major oil-producing countries of the Middle East are: the sheikdom of Kuwait, a British-protected state with 2,000 square miles of territory, 200,000 population, a production of 1,350,000 barrels a day and an oil income of better than \$375 million a year; the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, population six million, production 1,050,000 barrels per day, annual oil income \$300 million; Iraq, population five million, oil production 700,000 barrels, oil income \$250 million; Iran, population 20 million, oil production 850,000 barrels a day, oil income \$275 million; the sheikdom of Qatar, population 20,000, production 150,000 barrels a day, oil income \$50 million a year.

In my view, since there is no practical alternative for Europe and most of Asia to using Middle East oil, the insistence that the price of this oil continue to be set by private oil companies is indefensible. It makes no sense



to argue, as does a leading oil economist, that price is determined by the economic fact that when oil becomes too expensive Europe will turn to low-grade coal or other energy sources such as atomic power. This is like telling the house-holder that if electricity becomes too expensive he can always use candles! *Middle East oil is the cheapest source of energy available to the European consumer for his increasing needs. Therefore Middle East oil prices must eventually be regulated on the same basis as that of any public utility.*

If the oil companies could—by leaving present arrangements undisturbed—assure the continued supply of Middle East oil to consumers, perhaps it would make sense to go on paying them their average of a dollar per barrel in after-tax profits. But the trouble is: present arrangements will not endure, and while "sufficient unto the day" may be an adequate maxim for a business venture, it should not be the rule that guides the US Government.

Actually, if the companies are realistic, they will be willing to settle for regulation under national and international controls in preference not only to nationalization but to sweeping schemes for internationalization. At the time of the London conference on Suez in 1956, an influential British weekly, *The Observer*, proposed that Middle East oil resources be transferred "to an international public corporation representing both the local states and those providing the capital, which after payment of compensation would use the profits for the joint development of the region." Such proposals involving compensation unfortunately run aground on the fact that the companies would claim payment for their assets and *future* profits, not just the payment for the capital value of their installations; and since, combined, they can expect to earn about \$170 billion in the next 30-odd years as after-tax profits, at the anticipated dollar per barrel average, any agreement on the amount of compensation due would be impossible. This impossibility has been used by Washington to justify maintenance of present private arrangements—no matter what the corresponding political price and even at the risk of war. But between continuing the dollar-profit-a-barrel policy and compensating the companies in the amount of \$170 billion, there *is* an alternative.

On the surface it might seem that the Arab governments themselves stand to gain, along with the companies, from high prices and consequently larger oil royalties. But this ignores the old economic truth that high prices keep down sales, sales which should—given sensible pricing policies—increase on an astonishing scale of progression. Oil is not only essential to Europe today but is the *only* major reserve for a world whose rising population requires rapid industrialization. The US will be using 40 percent more oil in 1967 than in 1957. Europe's demand for oil will, at the least, double every eight years. The less-developed areas of the world will have an even greater demand for oil, Asia and particu-

larly India depending on the availability of cheap energy for their industrialization.

Already the new Iraqi regime has made clear—without yet threatening nationalization—that it will insist on greater revenues from its oil. Increased revenues for Iraq can be accomplished, it goes without saying, through price increases by the Iraq Petroleum Company accompanied by new concession terms giving Iraq a greater share of the profits. But why should this happen when, in the long run, everyone would be better served by *lower* prices?

To take another example, how can Kuwait, with a production cost of less than 8 cents a barrel, justify a price of \$1.85?

I propose that the producer and transit states of the Middle East, the oil companies (financing and operating) and the consumer states all submit themselves to compulsory jurisdiction of an international arbitration board—under the tutelage of the UN General Assembly—empowered to resolve disputes on prices and other matters between companies and governments (*i.e.* producer, transit and consumer governments). The board would arbitrate price disputes, not fix prices. Revision of price, or refusal to allow price changes, could only come as a consequence of a complaint to the board by one of the interested parties.

In the absence of this, or a similar price arbitration mechanism, the price of Middle East oil will remain administered (*i.e.* not based on the market) by companies which are often at one and the same time sellers and producers, refiners and marketers. Under existing policies, the price they set takes into account the price of oil in the US as well as the demands of producer and consumer states and of other potential trouble-makers who are not direct parties—such as the US Department of Justice, the US Congress and domestic producers. In the past nearly all price conflicts have been resolved *against* the consumer, *i.e.* a higher cost to the user has been the answer.

There are, to be sure, certain dilemmas implicit in any reduction of the price of Middle East oil. The world needs more oil and more venture capital to find the oil: the profit must be high enough to attract such venture capital. Also, our domestic producers—those advocates of "no governmental interference"—want iron-clad quotas to prevent any flooding of the US market with Middle East oil which even now is cheaper—delivered to the US—than domestic oil.

Neither of these dilemmas needs defeat us. A tariff could be levied on Middle East oil imported into the US, set at the difference between the US price and the delivered cost of Middle East oil. The revenues from this tariff could be used to buy shut-in production (*i.e.* discovered fields) for a US national petroleum reserve. To encourage new exploration in the Middle East, the present 50-50 formula—splitting half and half, between company and producer country, the difference between

cost and so-called "posted price"—could be amended to 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ percent for the company and 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent for the country for the first 500 million barrels, and 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent for the company and 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ percent for the country thereafter. The price of Persian Gulf oil should be reduced 20 percent from an average of about \$2 a barrel to about \$1.60 a barrel. The present concession holders in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait would of course get less profit—but even half of what the Kuwait owners now get annually (\$375 million)—would not be a bad profit after taxes!

This would be a reasonable proposal for the US to put to the producing countries of the Middle East. The producing countries could well agree to such new price levels because their unit profit would remain the same and with a lower price their production, which is to say markets, would rise appreciably.

Saudi, Iraqi and Americans with whom I have discussed this proposal raise an important related question: The companies would, they say, hike their prices *indirectly* beyond the control and even knowledge of the producing countries—through refinery, transportation and other charges. This fear seems to me groundless. But it leads to my second proposal.

II. A NEW CORPORATE STRUCTURE

It is a fact of profound political importance that the small Middle East state feels powerless before the major integrated oil company. "Standard Oil" (a term once used to describe any major American oil company) and "Anglo-Iranian" (the pre-Mossadeq British company in Iran) are now replaced with the epithet—"the oil companies." The memory of some of the rather questionable practices of "the oil companies" in influencing internal affairs of the various Arab countries is ever present. The possibility of sincere reformation of the oil companies is simply not believed. Kamil al-Chaderchi, the leader of the National Democratic Party of Iraq (one of the parties represented in the new regime) once said in talking to an AP correspondent:

Iraqi public opinion regards the oil companies as usurpers, the latter having conspired with the British government to rob the country of its most vital resources. The British Government has exploited Iraq's weakness, as in the case of the Mosul region which the Turks once claimed unrightly fully for themselves, and whose maintenance as part of Iraq the British said they would not uphold unless the Iraq Government was most indulgent with the Oil Company, failing which the Mosul region would go to the Turks who would readily grant the Oil Company the Concession.

Whether or not the British warning was meant as such it caused the Iraq Government to grant the con-

Low-Cost, High Profit Oil

THE IMMENSITY of Middle East oil fields permits extremely low production costs, ranging from less than 10 cents to a maximum of 30 cents a barrel for oil that is sold for \$2.12—an average profit per barrel of from \$1.75 to \$1.90. This, together with low exploration costs, results in astronomical profits, as it takes only five feet of drilling to discover the same amount of oil in the Middle East as is discovered by drilling one mile in this country.

THIS YEAR the oil companies and the producing states will split a profit of more than \$2.5 billion. In 1966, by which date the Chase Manhattan Bank estimates that the present production rate of 4 million barrels per day will increase to 8 million barrels per day, the profits under present prices would be \$5.5 billion. By 1974 production will again double for a profit of \$11 billion.

cession to the Company on a long-term basis and at a very cheap price.

This charge is true, and the defense that it happened in 1925 is not adequate in Iraq—even in 1958.

In Saudi Arabia, too, officials and intellectuals chafe at their helplessness in dealing with a group of integrated major companies. The Director General of Oil Affairs in the Saudi Government, Sheikh Abdullah Tariki, has said that the parent companies of ARAMCO—Standard Oil (New Jersey), Standard Oil (California), Texas, and Socony—encompass many interests opposed to those of Saudi Arabia. He feels ARAMCO should be an independent company doing business only in Saudi Arabia. It is being recognized to some extent—and indeed, it seems to me self evident—that government-owned or controlled companies—such as British Petroleum or Compagnie Française des Petroles—will not be tolerated for long in the Middle East (government-controlled companies are not permitted in most Latin American countries). But it is not recognized at all that the Arab governments will never fully trust the major integrated international company and want instead companies with interests restricted to each national jurisdiction.

What the Arabs want, in short, is what the US courts wanted when Dupont was ordered to divest itself of General Motors. In the case of ARAMCO, many Arab suspicions would be removed if the parent companies were to distribute their shares in ARAMCO to their shareholders. ARAMCO would then be a new and independent entity with economic interests more parallel to those of the Saudi Government. The Saudis would then have less reason to feel—as they do now—that some of the owners sell other oil before they sell Saudi oil. If an

independent ARAMCO decided on a reduction in price, its decision would be trusted as one made with long-range Saudi interests in mind.

To encourage the companies to disperse their stock I would favor legislation exempting such a "spin-off" of stock from capital gains taxation. This might seem to constitute a windfall, but if the oil companies could, by this means, be made to consider fundamental reorganization, I believe this would be a small price to pay for the attendant political benefits. Such a break-up of the operating companies would, moreover, help keep within bounds the ever-increasing political power of the integrated oil companies.

As a general rule I propose that ways be explored to restrict holdings by integrated companies to those foreign producing companies which export less than 200,000 barrels per day.

III. KUWAIT AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

With these two proposals as the basis for a new approach to the Middle East, we can proceed—and should proceed—to realize the full economic benefits of our reforms. We should move on toward the often-discussed Regional Development Fund into which surplus oil revenues would be channeled. Sen. Hubert Humphrey is one of the many who have pressed for such a Fund—under UN auspices—to serve as a capital reservoir and technical planning body for Middle East development.

To establish such a Fund the revenue surpluses of Kuwait would be essential—this year, for example, Kuwait could contribute \$250 million—and here joint action with Britain becomes necessary. With its production of 1.3 million barrels per day and its population of only 200,000 Kuwait has had enough surplus income (despite lavishness if not extravagance) to become the largest single provider of new capital to the London money market. Kuwait has exported three-quarters of a billion dollars of capital to Britain since 1950 and this year is expected to export at least \$200 million more. Needless to say this fact is known to Nasser, who is also aware that with capital-poor Egypt's rapidly increasing population he must obtain surplus capital for economic development unless Egypt is literally to starve. The increase in Egypt's population, now 23 million, is at a rate of close to 400,000 a year. That, not Israel, is Nasser's major problem.

A regional development fund financed by surplus revenues would do more than anything else, it seems to me, to assure a continuous flow of oil. Given such a Fund, the transit countries—Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon—would have a strong vested interest in keeping the oil coming from the fields through the pipelines to Western and Asian consumers.

As matters stand, in the absence of a Fund, the knowledge that so much surplus capital is leaving a region that is in such need of capital enrages Arab nationalists. It has seemed to many that the British have compromised their position as a trustee by over-eagerness to obtain the Sheikh of Kuwait's funds. The State Department, when asked if it had considered advising the British to have some of this sum invested in the Middle East, replied that the Sheikh of Kuwait insisted on his money being invested in London. I am informed that this is the view generally held by State Department Middle East experts; it isn't up to us, they say, to tell the Sheikh of Kuwait where to invest his funds. But since Kuwait exists only by virtue of British protection, American acquiescence in this channeling of massive amounts of capital from an under-developed region to a highly industrialized US ally is interpreted as American indifference to the welfare of the Middle East. Far from acquiescing, the US should, on the contrary, be prepared to help underwrite the loss to Britain of Kuwait investment capital.

While Nasser confers with the Sheikh of Kuwait, our State Department tells us that regional development plans are "impractical." There is some talk in the Department that transit dues might be raised (this to pacify for a time Arab owners), but this sounds suspiciously as though only another charge is to be passed on to the consumer. Less radical proposals than the diversion of Kuwait's surplus have been made recently by former British Minister of State Anthony Nutting, by the Lebanese politician-pipeline builder Emile Bustani and by the Foreign Minister of Italy. They envisage contributions by oil-producing governments and by the oil companies of 5 to 10 percent of their profits to a Middle East Regional Development Fund. But all such ideas have fallen on barren ground. On at least one occasion a plan of this nature was submitted to authorities in Washington by an oil man with the knowledge and approval of his company: the company was willing to have the plan discussed but not willing to sponsor it. State Department officials sympathetic to the project privately advised, however, that it would get nowhere unless it *was* sponsored by the companies. (Investigation confirmed that this was correct.) The project remains undisturbed in the archives of the Department.

I hold no illusions that any of the parties concerned will rush to adopt the proposals which I have set forth. But I submit that these are realistic suggestions. Certainly a clinging to the status quo can only lead to a succession of new losses by the West in the Middle East. The immediate goal of US policy must be to avoid nationalization until we can have internationalization.

The order of priority of those who must be persuaded to accept these proposals (and also, in my view, the order of difficulty) is the Administration, the American oil companies, the foreign oil companies—last, the Arabs.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

fidels. Unwilling to allow the natives of the area to decide the fate of their own lands, volunteer soldiers from all over Europe converged and marched onward to bring Christian orders out of Moslem chaos. The real motives of the Crusades became apparent to the victims with the sacking of Constantinople, but the appeal to greed, carefully cloaked in religious zeal, continued to be effective in gaining support for expeditions against Middle Eastern peoples. And so the real motives of this 9th Crusade, just proclaimed by President Eisenhower, are obvious to all but the people who will fight and pay for it. . . .

What is desperately needed today is a cool head and a sense for creative and positive diplomacy. An Arab nationalism consonant with Western interests cannot be achieved through the intransigent armed support of the traditional governments. The people of America should demand an Administration position which, though difficult, would be more in harmony with the ideals on which our own republic was created and which would close the invidious gap between American preachment and American practice.

HUGO P. MUNRO

University, Alabama

► The Right to a Passport

SIRS:

YOUR editorial of June 30, "The Court on the Right to a Passport," correctly points out the significance of the *Passport Cases* in throwing back to Congress the prior determination of permissible standards for restriction of the right to travel. Your editorial, however, seems to me unduly solicitous lest the Court in this or similar cases should have decided constitutional questions *per se*. You find it necessary to inquire, "Are we not here in the presence of that most dreaded of social diseases, judicial legislation?" And you quote Judge Learned Hand on the dangers of "Platonic Guardians."

Certainly, the views of the honorable Judge Hand in his Harvard lectures are quite persuasive in their questioning of the assumptions of judicial guardianship. The Hand position, however, should be weighed against the equally

persuasive arguments of Justice William O. Douglas in his recently-published *The Right of the People*, which emphasizes the primacy of First Amendment guarantees. Liberals of the mid-Fifties, still remembering the judicial obstructionism of the mid-Thirties are understandably wary of zealous judicial review. But there is a fundamental constitutional distinction between judicial intervention on economic and social matters and intervention on behalf of civil liberties, particularly First Amendment liberties. The distinction is this: In the latter cases the courts are upholding the *procedural* guarantees of the Constitution, seeing to it, in effect, that the rules of the democratic game are being observed; intervention on matters social and economic on the other hand means the courts are entering into the *substance* of democratic politics, are themselves taking a hand, so to speak, in favor of one or another of contending parties.


ARNOLD M. PAUL

Los Angeles, Calif.

► Stevenson for President

SIRS:

I WOULD LIKE to join the ranks of those who are expressing the desire to have a chance to vote for Adlai Stevenson in 1960. Our tangled relationships and drooping esteem abroad, and our confusion at home are awakening all, from the highest to the humblest, to awareness of the supreme need for the greatest intelligence that the most qualified or gifted, and most disciplined minds can offer. Twice the Democratic Party chose in Stevenson the candidate who so



well filled the need for intelligence and courage and integrity, but on those two occasions no one could possibly have won election on that party ticket in opposition to our most popular national hero.

Now, will the Democratic Party fail to nominate him because of the fear of some third-nomination bogey? We sincerely hope there will be no fearful superstitious donkey at the party convention standing in the way of the meeting of the greatest mind in American political life today with the gravest problems that have confronted our nation in all its history.

REV. RALPH W. EVERROAD

Kalamazoo, Mich.

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

AUTHORS WANTED BY N. Y. PUBLISHER

New York, N. Y.—One of the nation's largest book publishers is seeking manuscripts of all types—fiction, non-fiction, poetry. Special attention to new writers. If your work is ready for publication, send for booklet RP—*it's free*. Van- tage Press, 120 W. 31st St., New York 1. (Mid- west Office: 220 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago 4, Ill.)

FREE BOOK SEARCH

For any old, rare or out-of-print books. Libertarian Bookman, Box 7709, Chicago 80

LEARN WHILE ASLEEP! Exciting details free. Sleep-Learning Research Association, P.O. Box 24-NR, Olympia, Washington.

\$70 WEEKLY — home, spare time. Simplified mail bookkeeping. Immediate income — easy! Auditax, 84757 DA, Los Angeles 84.

The future of the world lies only partly in man's own hands. In reality he is a child, and this is his own playhouse.

Read *The Devil's Defense*.

Florence Varley, Rehoboth, Mass. (See Genesis 26:22)

Exposition Press, 386 Fourth Ave., N.Y.C.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! \$10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

FREE! Writer's Market List!

If you're interested in writing fiction or articles for leading magazines, or book publishers, Daniel S. Mead, prominent literary agent, has prepared a catalogue of markets which is a "must" item. For free copy write:

Daniel S. Mead, 915 Broadway, Dept. NR
N. Y. 10, N. Y.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. 7
101 N ST N E WASHINGTON 2, D C

BARGAIN BOOK SALE!

Exciting, useful, entertaining books for the whole family! Hand-picked "specials" from our stockroom, brand-new books from leading publishers at bargain prices. *Limited Quantities.*

1. **THE SECRET HISTORY OF STALIN'S CRIMES**, by Alexander Orlov, former Soviet Counter-Intelligence chief. The full, shocking inside story of Stalin's private life, with never-before-told details on his mass arrests and murders. Pub. at 4.50 **Sale—\$1.98**

2. **THE GREAT CHARLIE—Chaplin**. A Biography of the Tramp, by Robert Payne. A penetrating look at the world-famous comedian—his London boyhood, early stage work and new insights into the magic of his screen personality. With 19 excellent stills from his memorable movies, "Gold Rush," "City Lights," etc. **Special: 2.98**

3. **THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON** The only available one-volume collection of his letters, speeches, general battle orders, and other public and private papers. 697 pages. Pub. at \$5. **Sale \$1.98**

4. **WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST**. An anthology edited by E. D. Coblenz. An important and revealing book on the legendary figure behind the most powerful newspaper empire in history. **Sale 1.98**

5. **CHAMPION CAMPAIGNER: FDR**, by H. Gosnell. The story of the Man and the Myth—the strategy, tactics, and personality that led Roosevelt to become the master politico. Illustrated. An important book. Published at 8.50. **Sale 1.98**

6. **THE LOBBYISTS**. Karl Schriftgiesser's explosive, behind-the-scenes story of how the lobbies operate, the special interests they work for, and the millions they spend to influence you and your government. Pub. at \$3.95. **Sale: 1.98**

7. **THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES**, by Prof. E. Franklin Frazier. Vital study of the Negro family and its evolution in the United States. **Special: 2.98**

8. **THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. A History and An Argument**, by Col. Robert R. McCormick. Scarce and unusual. **1.49**

9. **Vets: YOU GOT IT COMING TO YOU!** The only book containing complete information for the serviceman, veteran, and members of his family. Answers to questions about rights, benefits, and privileges. "Worth its weight in Government checks." **\$2.98**

10. **THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: Its Origin & Development**, by Kelly & Harbison. A vigorous, dramatic, scholarly work. Almost 1,000 pages. Pub. at \$8.50. Last few copies without jackets at **\$3.95**

11. **THE AMERICAN LAWYER**, by Porter & Blaustein. The complete, absorbing story of the legal profession in America. Pub. at \$5.50. **Sale: \$2.98**

12. **Nicolas Bardyev—CHRISTIANITY & ANTI-SEMITISM**. A moving and powerful book by one of the great thinkers of our time—every aspect of the 2,000 year-old problem, from the absurdity of prejudice to Hitler's mass murders. Scarce. **\$2.75**

13. **MY MISSION TO SPAIN**, by Claude O. Bowers. From the unpublished diaries of our former ambassador to Spain—the secret history of the Spanish Civil War. Pub. at \$6. **Sale: \$2.98**

14. **OUR CHILDREN ARE CHEATED!** Benjamin Fine's factual indictment of American education. A must for every thoughtful parent. Pub. at \$3. **Sale: \$1.49**

15. **ENTENTE DIPLOMACY AND THE WORLD**. Edited by G. A. Schreiner. Matrix of History of Europe, 1909-1914. 762 pages containing 858 documents, some top secret, that mirrored one of the most critical periods of European history leading to WWI. Scarce and important source book, long o.p. Pub. at \$10. **Sale: \$2.98**

16. **ROBERTA COWELL'S STORY**. The RAF pilot's amazing sex-reversal, as told by "herself." 20 photo illus. Pub. \$3. **Sale: \$1.49**

17. **FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AT HYDE PARK**, by Olin Dows. A life-long friend of FDR tells the fascinating story of his boyhood and later years in 174 superb drawings and sparkling text. An over-sized, handsome volume. Pub. at \$5.00. **Sale: \$2.98**

18. **An Introduction to ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY**, by V. E. Fisher. A key to the understanding of the abnormal or maladjusted personality, with illustrative case histories. 553 pages. **\$3.50**

19. **GREAT STORIES OF SCIENCE FICTION**. Intro. by Clifton Fadiman. The best of the genre. A dozen spell-binding tales by twelve past-masters of the fantasy story. **\$2.98**

20. **The Nazi War Lords—THE SEVEN MEN OF SPANDAU**. Hess, Doenitz, Von Neurath, et al—what they are thinking and scheming in the world's most carefully guarded prison. An incredible first hand account. **Special: \$2.98**

21. **THE MAN BEHIND ROOSEVELT**, by L. Stiles. Fascinating, behind-the-scenes story of Louis McHenry Howe, whose faith and shrewdness made FDR President. Illus. Pub. at \$4.75. **Sale: \$1.98**

22. **PROS & CONS: A DEBATER'S GUIDE**. A comprehensive and concise handbook on hundreds of controversial topics including abstinence, birth control, censorship, faggot, etc. **Only \$1.98**

23. **GHOSTS AND WITCHES**. Eerie, macabre, spine-tingling stories of Spectral Coaches. Headless Queens, Devils on Horseback, etc.—all reported by real-life people, and thrillingly retold. Illustrated. Published at 4.00 **Sale: \$1.98**

24. **e. e. cummings—EIMI: JOURNAL OF A TRIP TO RUSSIA**. One of the most remarkable travel diaries of our time, written in brilliant prose by one of our foremost poets. Witty, intensely human impressions of the spiritual and intellectual climate of Russia—as spontaneously written by e. e. cummings. **Special: \$2.98**

25. **The War of 1812—POLTROONS AND PATRIOTS**, by G. Tucker. The magnificent two-volume history, boxed and illustrated—a vivid, exciting recreation of the issues, battles, and personalities. Jefferson, Madison, Tecumseh, et al. Pub. at \$10 **Last few sets only \$6.95**

26. **SEX: METHODS & MANNERS**, by Dr. L. Berg & R. Street. Direct straightforward guide to achieving sex happiness in marriage. Illustrated. Pub. at \$3.50. **Special: \$1.98**

\$1.25 EACH — 5 FOR \$5

A1. **Adlai Stevenson: WHAT I THINK**. Selected from speeches and writings since 1952. Pub. at \$3

A2. **ATOMIC ENERGY: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL**, by D. S. Teeple. An urgent blueprint for atomic control. Pub. at \$3

A3. **FRONTIERS ARE NOT BORDERS**, by S. S. Hanks. Understanding the peoples of the world.

A4. **RESTORING OUR AMERICAN HERITAGE**, by V. Garnett. An appeal to the Independent voters of America. Pub. at \$3.50

A5. **A CATHOLIC SPEAKS HIS MIND ON AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONFLICT**. Thomas Surgrue's brilliant book.

A6. **EDUCATION FOR RURAL AMERICA**, by F. W. Reeves. Important, thoughtful book. Pub. at \$2.50

A7. **LABOR: FREE AND SLAVE**, by B. Mandel. Workingmen and the anti-slavery movement in the U. S. Pub. at \$3

A8. **RHEUMATISM**, by Otto Meyer, M.D. A book of importance to rheumatism sufferers. Illus.

A9. **HOW TO STOP SMOKING**, by H. Brean. Money back guarantee! A sure-fire psychological method. Pub. at 2.50

A10. **YAMA, THE PIT**, by Alexander Kuprin. The lusty novel that felt the censor's lash. Out-of-print Modern Library edition

A11. **NEW BROOMS**. Robert Shore's bright, witty, provocative essays on such stimulating subjects as: A Bachelor on Women, The Science of Making Enemies. Beds for The Bad, etc.

A12. **TELECASTING AND COLOR**, by K. Tyler. Scientific story of TV. Illus. Pub. at \$4

A13. **HUNGRY GULLIVER: An English Critical Appraisal of Thomas Wolfe**. Pub. \$2.50

A14. **IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY**, by Bertrand Russell. Paper edition.

A15. **THE PRICE OF PEACE**. A realistic, two-fisted plan for sensible disarmament, by Charles G. Bolt. Pub. at \$2.50

A16. **GOD'S SECRET ARMIES**. Joseph Johnston's inspiring story of the men and women behind the Iron Curtain who risk all for God. A remarkable book to both own and give. Pub. at 3.75

A17. **THE DANCE OF DEATH! 50 Drawings and Captions** by Jean Charlet. "Death" informing all sorts of people that He has come for them. Pub. at \$3.50

A18. **FIGHTING WORDS**. An anthology of great words to live by, from the Greek philosophers.

A19. **REVEILLE FOR RADICALS**. Saul Alinsky's striking account of an orderly revolution already under way! Pub. at 2.50

A20. **MEMOIRS OF A BUCCANEER**, by Louis Le Golif. The adventures in love and battle of a swaggering pirate superman in the 17th century. A lusty, factual account. Pub. \$4.

A21. **W. E. Woodward's GIFT OF LIFE**. Autobiography of Paine's great biographer. Pub. \$4.75

A22. **SHOCKING LIFE**. Elsa Schiaparelli's story of her fabulous career. Pub. \$4

A24. **TOWARD SOCIAL ECONOMY**, by H. Bowen. Complete course in basic economics. Pub. \$4.

A25. **WHY STOP SMOKING?** by H. Ostrow. The real facts behind the smoking scares. Pub. \$2.

A26. **THE COMMUNIST TRAIL IN AMERICA**. Jacob Spolansky's most amazing report—by a man who has been tracking down communists for 30 years. A detailed and frightening account of spying and subversion in our own back yard. Pub. \$3.50

A27. **HOW PRAYER HELPS ME**. Testimonials by 71 famous Americans, Jimmy Durante, Harry Truman, Walt Disney, etc.

A28. **THE PLOT TO OVERTHROW XMAS**. Norman Corwin's great narrative poem that stirred millions. A modern classic that the NY Times called "unforgettable."

A29. **A PLATFORM FOR THE AMERICAN WAY**. An urgent blueprint for regaining & protecting our American freedoms. Pub. at \$2.

A30. **MONSTER MIDWAY**, by W. L. Gresham. An uninhibited look at the glittering world of the carnival. Pub. \$3.75.

A31. **THE COSMIC COMMONWEALTH**, by Edmond Holmes. A remarkably penetrating study of "God," nature, man and the world. A thought-provoking book long out-of-print. No jacket.

A32. **LONDON FOR AMERICANS**. Lively stories of Paine, Poe, Mark Twain and other "tramps abroad." 41 illus. Imported.

A33. **NATIONALITY & ITS PROBLEMS**, by Sidney Herbert. A penetrating study of nationalism, with a history up to the League of Nations. Long out-of-print. No jacket.

—LIST ALTERNATE SELECTION—

FREE!! With every order over \$5 we will include free book: "POLITICAL ZOO". Over 100 hilarious pictures with subtle (and not so subtle) political overtones. Smash Best-Seller.

WORLD WIDE BOOK SERVICE

525 Broadway, New York 12

Gentlemen: Please send me, postage prepaid, the books numbered below. I understand if my order is over \$5 I will receive ABSOLUTELY FREE "POLITICAL ZOO."

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____

ZONE _____

STATE _____